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Abstract: This study investigates how disclosure of the board of directors’
leadership and role in risk oversight (BODs oversight disclosure) influences
investors’ judgments when information on risk exposures is disclosed. The
theoretical lens through which we examine this issue involves negativity bias.
Sixty-two stock market investors who engage in the evaluation and/or
investment of stocks on a regular or professional basis participated in our
study. Our results reveal that the addition of BODs oversight disclosure
(positive information) does not carry significant weight on investor judgments
(i.e., attractiveness and investment) when financial statement disclosures
indicate a high level of operational and financial risk exposures (negative
information). In contrast, under the condition of a low level of risk exposures,
BODs oversight disclosure causes investors to assess higher risk in terms of
worry, catastrophic potentials and unfamiliarity about risk information and, in
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turn, make less favorable investor judgments. Our findings add to the
literature on negativity bias and contribute to the debate on the usefulness of
disclosures about risk.
Keywords: BODs oversight disclosure; investor judgments; risk-as-feelings;
risk disclosures.

Running Title: Negativity Bias in Investors’ Reactions
“…As a Commissioner of a disclosure-based agency [former Chairman
Laura Unger], I believe that more information is generally better. But
is that always the case? (SEC, 2000)”1

Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis caused investors to critically question
the role of boards of directors in managing firms’ material risk
exposures, including operational and financial risks, and motivated
investors to demand more transparency (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Lipton,
Neff, Brownstein, Rosenblum, Emmerich, Niles, & Walker, 2010;
Nicholson, 2009). As a response, in late 2009, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) required publicly traded companies to
report information on how their board of directors (BODs) are fulfilling
a risk oversight role and interacting with senior executives to oversee
enterprise risk management (hereafter BODs oversight disclosure).
These disclosure rules are intended to benefit investors in making
“informed decisions” (SEC, 2009, p. 4). However, research has paid
little attention as to how BODs oversight disclosure influences investor
judgments, instead focusing on documenting the state of risk
management practices and the BODs risk oversight responsibilities
(e.g., Beasley, Branson, & Hancock, 2010; 2011; Deloitte, 2013;
Gates, 2006; Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation
(IIARF), 2011; Raber, 2003).
In this study, we investigate whether the disclosure of positive
information related to the BODs quality and leadership role in risk
oversight mitigates the effect of negative information about
operational and financial risk exposures (hereafter risk disclosure) on
investors’ judgments. We examine this issue through the theoretical
lens of “negativity bias” (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, &
Vohs, 2001). Studies in psychology have demonstrated that negative
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information related to bad events carries more weight, elicits more
information processing, and activates stronger affective reactions in
decision making than positive information related to good events (e.g.,
Fiske, 1980; Ikegami, 1993; Klinger, Barta, & Maxeiner, 1980;
Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001; Pratto & John, 1991). This bias to
negative information has also been documented in financial risk
analysis. For example, a disclosure of potential risk can elicit a strong
affective reaction (Koonce, McAnally, & Mercer, 2005) and influence
investors’ assessment of a firm’s future performance and their
resultant investment decisions (e.g., Fortin & Berthelot, 2012).
We extend the research on negativity bias by conducting an
experiment that investigates how BODs oversight disclosure interacts
with risk disclosure and influences investor judgments. Using a 2 x 2
between-subjects experiment, we employ a sample of 62 stock market
investors who engage in the evaluation and/or investment of stocks on
a regular or professional basis (T𝑜̈rngren & Montgomery, 2004). We
present participants with a hypothetical case scenario adapted from a
Fortune 500 annual report and proxy statement. In the case scenario,
we manipulate the risk disclosure condition as a high or low level of
operational and financial risk exposures and the BODs oversight
disclosure condition as the absence or presence of information related
to the BODs quality and leadership role in risk oversight.
Our results indicate that under the high risk disclosure
condition, participants’ judgments do not differ significantly when
BODs oversight disclosure is present compared to when BODs
oversight disclosure is absent. In contrast, when evaluating an
investment opportunity under the low risk disclosure condition,
participants make less favorable investment judgments in the
presence of BODs oversight disclosure than in the absence of BODs
oversight disclosure. These results suggest that the disclosure of a
high level of risk exposures carries significantly more weight on
investment judgments than information about the BODs quality and
leadership role in risk oversight. On the other hand, when financial
statement disclosures indicate a low level of risk exposures, the
addition of BODs oversight disclosure works in a counterintuitive way
by amplifying investors’ risk perceptions and discouraging investment
decisions. Subsequent analyses show that under the low risk
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disclosure condition, the disclosure of BODs role in risk oversight
disclosure causes participants to assess risk in affective terms, where
feelings of worry, catastrophic potentials, and unfamiliarity about risk
information—i.e., Risk-as-Feelings (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, &
MacGregor, 2004)—explain participants’ judgments. Overall, our
findings suggest that investors do not effectively integrate BODs
oversight disclosure information into their judgments when risks are
disclosed. The results fail to provide support for the notion that added
transparency provided by the BODs oversight disclosure improves
investors’ decisions.
From a theoretical perspective, this study adds to the literature
on negativity bias in the context of risk oversight disclosure and
provides support for prior research on negativity bias in investors’
decision-making (Cianci & Falsetta, 2008; Ghosh & Wu, 2012). From a
practical perspective, our findings contribute to the debate on the
usefulness of disclosures about risk. This study should be of interest to
regulators who are currently evaluating existing disclosure
requirements (SEC, 2014) or revising a disclosure framework (FASB,
2014) in response to users’ and preparers’ concerns about the
usefulness of disclosures, the perceived disclosure overload, and the
amount of disclosure content.
In the remainder of this chapter we review literature related to
risk disclosure, BODs oversight disclosure and negativity bias and put
forth our hypotheses. We subsequently explain the methodology used
to test the hypotheses and describe the participants, experimental
procedures, and the independent and dependent variables. Finally, we
report results and discuss their implications, suggest directions for
future research, and point out limitations that should be considered
when generalizing from our findings.
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Background And Hypotheses Development
Risk Disclosure and the Board’s Leadership and Risk
Oversight Role
In the early 1990s, significant derivative losses resulted from
market volatilities in interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates,
commodity prices, and equity prices. Those volatile markets, coupled
with a lack of adequate disclosure about derivative instruments and
their related risks, led investors to demand adequate risk disclosure
(Linsmeier & Pearson, 1997; Schrand & Elliot, 1998). Since then,
regulators have paid considerable attention to promoting and
improving transparency regarding risks faced by companies (Linsley &
Shrives, 2006), and firms have increasingly engaged in risk reporting
as part of their financial reporting practices (Dobler, 2008). As a result
of increased risk reporting among preparers and regulators, research
has examined different aspects of risk disclosure such as usefulness
(e.g., Bozzolan, Trombetta & Beretta, 2009), content (e.g., Dia &
Zéghal, 2008), and risk-related corporate governance characteristics
(e.g., Abraham & Cox, 2007).
Additional studies have investigated types of risk categories
(e.g., Linsley & Shrives, 2006), firm size effects on disclosures (e.g.,
Amran, Bin, & Hassan, 2009), and the prevalence of qualitative risk
reports over quantitative risk information in annual reports (e.g.,
Dobler, 2008). Further, experimental evidence indicates that investors
are less likely to invest in opportunities they feel have greater risk, in
particular operational and financial risks or discrete areas of financial
risks2 (e.g., Arnold, Bedard, Phillips, & Sutton, 2012; Dietrich,
Kachelmeier, Kleinmuntz, & Lismeier, 2001; Dobler, 2008; Hirst,
Hopkins, & Wahlen, 2004; Koonce et al., 2005; Lipe, 1998; Olsen,
1997). Despite the efforts of regulators, policy makers, and preparers
to ensure adequate risk disclosures, the 2008 financial crisis in the
U.S. subprime market and the related liquidity crunch caused investors
to become concerned about the BODs role in monitoring enterprise risk
management (e.g., Kirkpatrick, 2009; Lipton et al., 2010; Nicholson,
2009).

Advances in Accounting Behavioral Research, Vol 18 (2015): pg. 33-68. DOI. This article is © Emerald (JAI Press) and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald (JAI Press) does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from
Emerald (JAI Press).

5

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

In response, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) adopted new rules that require publicly traded companies to
disclose information regarding their BODs’ leadership structure and
role in the oversight of enterprise risk management (hereafter BOD
oversight disclosure). The SEC’s disclosure requirement is intended to
increase transparency for “investors as to how the board functions”
and improve “investors’ and shareholders’ understanding about how a
company perceives the role of its board and the relationship between
the board and senior management in managing material risks [e.g.,
operational and financial risks] facing the company” (SEC, 2009, p.
42-43). By 2010, most publicly traded companies reported that their
BODs directly and actively monitor, to some extent, corporate risks
related to their companies’ strategic and business decisions (Goldberg
& Harsch, 2010). In those disclosures, firms typically discussed the
board’s leadership structure and involvement in risk oversight, with an
emphasis on the role of a lead director or independent directors in
monitoring corporate risks (Akin Gump, Strauss, Hauer, & Feld LLP,
2010).
To date, research related to BODs oversight disclosure remains
rather limited as it primarily provides descriptive data about risk
oversight practices. For example, a 2010 COSO-sponsored study
reports that 42.2% of publicly traded companies had assigned a BOD
committee with responsibility for risk oversight (Beasley et al., 2010).
A 2011 AICPA-sponsored study finds that there has been a noticeable
improvement in publicly traded companies’ BODs oversight practices,
as 62.7% have a BOD committee monitoring enterprise risk
management, but the extent to which the board reviews and discusses
top risk exposures in the context of strategic planning tends to be
limited (Beasley et al., 2011). A report by the research foundation of
the IIARF found that public companies’ audit committees are assigned
“the oversight responsibilities for 67% of the risks” (IIARF, 2011,
p.17). A 2013 study by Deloitte shows an increasing trend in the
percentage of companies with audit committees taking primary
responsibility for risk and risk oversight (from 58% in 2010 to 64% in
2013), and in the allocation of risk oversight responsibilities among
various board committees (from 82% in 2010 to 91% in 2013)
(Deloitte, 2013).
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The Effect of BODs Oversight Disclosure on Investor
Judgments: A Negativity Bias Perspective
Studies from psychology demonstrate that negative information
is more visible or noticeable, carries more weight, activates stronger
responses, and has a greater impact on information processing than
positive information (e.g., Cacioppo, Berntson, & Gardner, 1999;
Fiske, 1980; Ikegami, 1993; Klinger et al., 1980; Öhman et al., 2001;
Pratto & John, 1991; Slovic, 1993; Smith, Cacioppo, Larsen &
Chartrand, 2003). Greater sensitivity to negative information is known
as negativity bias (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2001; Taylor, 1991). In the
context of risk analysis, people often assess risky situations by
attending to negative information more than positive information. For
example, Slovic (1993) found that information on a nuclear plant’s
potential safety problems, exposure to a series of accidents, and
health issue incidences (negative information) had a larger effect on
decreasing trust (or increasing risk perception)3 for plant management
than the effect of disclosure on the plant’s absence of safety problems
or health issues (positive information) had on increasing trust.
Likewise, the results of a study by MacGregor, Slovic and Morgan
(1994) reveal that concerns about health risks increased significantly
after subjects read a brochure informing them of potential health risks
of electromagnetic fields (negative information) even though they
were told that scientific evidence of health risks associated with
electromagnetic fields is lacking (positive information).
Evidence-related risk analysis also indicates that negative (or
risk) information elicits more intense affective reaction than positive
(or benefit) information (e.g., Ito, Larsen, Smith & Cacioppo, 1998;
Slovic et al., 2004). For example, additional risk (or benefit)
information amplifies the salience of risks (or benefits) in decision
making and changes subjects’ affective or favorability assessments in
accordance with the direction of risk (or benefit) manipulation
information (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic & Johnson, 2000). Further,
empirical evidence related to risk disclosures reveals that a potential
loss outcome associated with disclosed financial risks elicits strong
affective reactions (specifically, feelings of dread), significantly
influencing risk perceptions (Koonce et al. 2005) and performance
evaluations and investment decisions (Fortin & Berthelot, 2012).
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Based on prior research, we expect that disclosing potential
exposure to a high level of operational and financial risks (hereafter
the high risk disclosure condition) will draw investors’ attention to the
risks disclosed and, in turn, elicit a stronger affective reaction when
compared to disclosing potential exposure to a low level of operational
and financial risks (hereafter the low risk disclosure condition). This
quick and emotional response to risks is known as Risk-as-Feelings
(Slovic et al., 2004) and represents investors’ risk assessments from
an affective perspective (Koonce et al., 2005; Slovic, 1987).
Considering the magnitude of effect of high risk disclosure on
investors’ judgments, we expect that additional disclosure on the BODs
oversight role in monitoring enterprise risk management will not
mitigate the effect of high risk information on risk assessments (Riskas-Feelings) and, in turn, investor judgments. This is because
disclosure of high risk exposures (negative information) will carry
more weight in investor judgments than BODs oversight disclosure
(positive information). This effect, or lack thereof, has been found in
other contexts. For example, Anderson and Maletta (1999) found that
risk judgments on material misstatements are greater when auditors
are instructed to evaluate audit evidence in a high inherent risk4
context than in a low inherent risk context. Under a high inherent risk
condition, auditors’ assessment of material misstatement risk does not
differ when negative internal control information is evaluated before
positive internal control information (or vice versa) suggesting that
high inherent risk factors significantly influence auditors’ risk
judgments and positive internal control information has little effect on
risk judgments. Similarly, Su and Chang (2010) report that, as the
quantity of negative financial information increases, the purchase
intention of investors decreases significantly more for companies with
a positive corporate image than for companies with a negative
corporate image, showing greater incremental effects of negative
financial information on investor judgments in the former context than
in the latter context. Based on this discussion, we propose the
following hypothesis:
H1: In a high risk disclosure condition, investor judgments in
the presence of BODs oversight disclosure will not differ
from investor judgments made in the absence of BODs
oversight disclosure.
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Under the low risk disclosure condition, contrary to the SEC’s
intent of benefitting investors by offering greater transparency, we
expect that the addition of BODs oversight disclosure (positive
information) will draw investors’ attention to potential risk exposures
(negative information). This bias to negative information (risks
disclosed) resulting from oversight disclosure will likely amplify
investors’ affective reaction to risks disclosed (Risk-as-Feelings) or
assessment of risk exposures, causing them to make less favorable
judgments compared to judgments made in the absence of BODs
oversight disclosure. This leads to a second hypothesis:
H2: In a low risk disclosure condition, investors will make less
favorable judgments in the presence of BODs oversight
disclosure than in the absence of BODs oversight
disclosure.
Prior research indicates that affective responses to a target or
stimulus indirectly influence judgments (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003;
Lerner & Keltner, 2000). That is, while deliberating a future action,
individuals process cues and anticipate outcomes leading to affective
responses. These responses, in turn, influence information processing,
where individuals tend to selectively process information that supports
their initial affective responses (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer,
1994). Consistent with this view, accounting research has documented
that investors’ attitudes mediate the relationship between disclosures
and investment judgments. For example, Frederickson and Miller
(2004) found that non-professional investors (MBA students) in a proforma disclosure condition (both pro-forma earnings and GAAP
earnings disclosed) assess an earnings announcement more favorably
and, in turn, judge stock prices higher than those in a GAAP earnings
disclosure condition. Further analysis indicates that non-professional
investors’ attitudes (i.e., perceived favorableness) about an earnings
announcement mediate the relationship between pro-forma disclosures
and stock price judgments.
Building from Frederickson and Miller (2004), Victoravich (2010)
found that investors’ affective reaction to a GAAP earnings
announcement (current year earnings increased 15%) mediates the
effect of investor experience level on stock price judgments.
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Specifically, unsophisticated investors (undergraduate non-accounting
students) assess earnings announcement more favorably and, in turn,
assess stock prices higher, than sophisticated investors (MBA
students). The influence of affective state on judgments appears to
occur more often in situations of low risk, where subjects have a low
need for cognition and rely on simple judgment processes, than in
situations of high risks (e.g., Anderson & Maletta, 1999; Maletta,
1993; Maletta & Kida, 1993). For example, Rose (2001) found that the
recall patterns of subjects with a low need for cognition are influenced
more by induced affective states (i.e., sad or happy mood) than the
recall patterns of subjects with a high need for cognition. Consistent
with this finding, Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee and Welch (2001, p. 274)
noted that “…feelings [affective reaction to a situation] may be more
than just an important input into decision making under uncertainty;
they may be necessary and, to a large degree, mediate the connection
between the cognitive evaluation of risk and risk-related behavior…”
Drawing from this research, we expect that, under the low risk
disclosure condition, the effect of BODs oversight disclosure on
investor judgments will be accounted for by investors’ affective
reaction to risks disclosed—i.e., Risk-as-Feelings or risk assessment
from an affective perspective (Koonce et al., 2005; Slovic, 1987;
Slovic et al., 2004). This leads to a third hypothesis:
H3: In a low risk disclosure condition, Risk-as-Feelings will
mediate the impact of BODs oversight disclosure on
investor judgments.
Figure 1 graphically illustrates the relationship between the constructs
and operationalized variables proposed in the hypotheses.
[Insert Figure 1 here]

Research Method
We perform an experiment with a 2 x 2 between-subjects
design where we manipulate the risk disclosure condition as a high or
low level of operational and financial risk exposures and the BODs
oversight disclosure condition as the absence or presence of
information about the board’s leadership structure and role in
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monitoring enterprise risk management. Outcome measures included
participants’ risk perceptions from an affective perspective (Risk-asFeelings), attention to disclosure and financial information, and
ultimately investor judgments. Descriptions of the participants,
experimental procedures, and measurement of the independent and
dependent variables are provided in detail in subsequent sections.

Participants
We test our hypotheses with an experiment involving 62 stock
market investors who engage in the evaluation and/or investment of
stocks on a regular or professional basis (T𝑜̈rngren & Montgomery,
2004, p. 150).5 Participation was obtained through contacts developed
in coordination with an advisory board of the School of Business of a
public university located in the mid-western United States. In total, 73
participants voluntarily accepted our invitation, but nine did not fully
complete the task and two did not accurately respond to manipulation
check items. After eliminating these eleven participants, the final
sample consisted of 62 participants (41 males), all working in areas
that involve evaluation of and/or investment in stocks on a regular or
professional basis, with a mean years of investment experience of
12.16 years. Demographic data for the sample are summarized in
Table 1.
The 62 participants were randomly assigned across the four
treatment conditions. We performed chi-square analyses and a oneway ANOVA on the demographic data (Gender, Type of Employer,
Years of Investment Experience, Undergraduate Major and Graduate
Major). Table 1 shows that demographic factors do not differ
significantly across treatment conditions (all p > 0.05), and that
Investor Judgments across demographic factors do not yield any
significant relationship (all p > 0.05)6, except for Undergraduate Major
(p = 0.077) (not tabulated).7 A correlation analysis (see Table 6 in
subsequent sections) shows that Years of Investment Experience does
not significantly correlate with Investor Judgments (p > 0.10).
Considering these results, our participants’ demographic profile
appears to be adequately balanced across treatment conditions and
demographic factors are not significantly related to outcome
measures. Thus, we do not include demographic factors in further
tests.
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[Insert Table 1 here]

Experimental Materials and Procedures
Participants were presented with paper-based case material8 in
individual sessions. They were not compensated and did not face any
time limits. The case scenario was based on the annual report of a
Fortune 500 company (a food manufacturing company) and a proxy
statement with detailed information about risk exposures and the BOD
leadership structure and role in risk oversight. The actual name of the
Fortune 500 Company was replaced with a hypothetical name. This
approach is similar to that used by prior research examining investors’
judgment and decision making (e.g., Frederickson & Miller, 2004;
Miller & Sedor, 2014).
All participants were provided with the hypothetical company’s
background information, including the company’s profile and a
summary of three-year financial indicators, and information on the
company’s exposures to Operational Risk, Financial Risk, and Other
Risks. One group of participants received high risk disclosure
information and another group of participants received low risk
disclosure information. See Appendix A for a description of risk
disclosure information. Irrespective of risk disclosure condition,
participants received the same information on Other Risks. After
learning the company’s risk exposures (high or low), one group of
participants indicated their perceptions of the company’s risk
exposures (i.e., the absence of BODs oversight disclosure condition)
while the other group of participants read the BODs oversight
disclosure and then assessed the company’s risk exposures. See
Appendix B for a description of BODs oversight disclosure information.
Next, participants across all conditions received the same five-year
financial summary information related to the company and were then
instructed to make their investment judgments (i.e., attractiveness
and investment). Upon the completion of the experimental task,
participants responded to demographic questions, manipulation check
items, and a number of debriefing items. See Table 2 for more
information on the experimental procedures.
[Insert Table 2 here]
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Measures
Dependent Variable: Investor Judgments
To measure investor judgments, we employed approaches
similar to those used by Lipe (1998) and Holt and DeZoort (2009).
Specifically, we asked participants to indicate with what degree of
attractiveness they viewed the hypothetical company’s stock as an
investment opportunity (0 = not attractive, 100 = highly attractive)
(Attractiveness), and how likely they would be to invest in the
hypothetical company’s stock (0 = not at all likely, 100 = extremely
likely) (Investment). Before hypotheses testing, we combined the
Attractiveness and Investment items into one measure (referred to as
Investor Judgments) because they are significantly correlated (𝜌̂ =
0.861, p < 0.001). The Cronbach’s Alpha (reliability statistics) of the
combined measure is 0.923.

Independent Variable: Risk Disclosures
Financial risk is the most prevalent category of risk disclosure
across the 160 listed firms9 in the manufacturing sector of the U.S.,
Canada, U.K., and Germany, followed by market risk and operational
risk categories as well as non-financial category risks (Dobler, Lajili, &
Zéghal, 2011; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005). To simulate a realistic scenario
based on an all-inclusive approach, participants were provided with
disclosure information about Operational and Financial risks as well as
Other Risks (i.e., non-financial risks).10 The risk disclosure
information (i.e., Operational, Financial, and Other Risks) was based
on the annual report of a Fortune 500 company (a food manufacturing
company). We manipulated the operational and financial categories of
risk as high or low by using sensitivity analysis. This approach is
similar to that of Koonce et al. (2005) and provides explicit estimates
of the potential losses in future earnings, cash flows, or equity that
arise from the failure to manage risk exposures (Rajgopal, 1999). See
Appendix A for a more detailed description of the risk disclosure
manipulation.

Independent Variable: Board of Directors’ Oversight Disclosure
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The manipulation of the board’s role in risk oversight consisted
of the exclusion (absence) or inclusion (presence) of BODs oversight
disclosure. For the latter case, we used information about the board’s
leadership structure and role in monitoring enterprise risk
management (ERM) from the proxy statement of the same Fortune
500 company, as it clearly provides information mandated by the SEC.
For specific information on BODs oversight disclosure, see Appendix B.
In addition, information on the board’s makeup, characteristics, and
attendance at annual board meetings was presented11 n because this
information is included in the proxy statement and because prior
research has found that investors’ perception of the board’s
effectiveness is influenced by its independence (Beasley & Petroni,
2001), financial expertise (Gendron & Bédard, 2006; Norman, Rose, &
Suh, 2011; Sharma, 2006), size (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2004) and
number of annual meetings (Chen & Zhou, 2007).

Mediating Variables: Risk Perceptions
To measure risk perceptions, we incorporated the items utilized
by Koonce et al. (2005). These items covered participants’ perceptions
of: loss outcome (LossOutcome), loss probability (LossProbability),
gain outcome (GainOutcome), gain probability (GainProbability),
probability of neither an economic gain nor an economic loss
(StatusQuo), precise knowledge of the risk by the participant
(ParticipantKnow), precision of management’s knowledge of the risk
(ManagementKnow), management’s ability to limit the risk (Control),
worry (Worry), the catastrophic nature of potential loss (Catastrophic),
and newness of the risk (Newness).12 Next, we conducted a
confirmatory factor analysis to combine the items into distinct factors
of risk assessment. This analysis resulted in a three -factor solution.13
The factor loadings are displayed in Table 3. Factor one is titled Riskas-Analysis and includes perceptions of LossOutcome, LossProbability,
GainOutcome, and GainProbability, all representing risk perception
from the decision-theory perspective (Koonce et al., 2005). That is,
risk judgments were analyzed and evaluated though the use of
“algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus or formal
logic” (Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 2004). Factor two is titled Risk-asControl and includes perceptions of ParticipantKnow,
ManagementKnow, and Control, all representing perceived
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controllability of risk (Koonce et al., 2005; Slovic, 1987). Factor three
is titled Risk-as-Feelings and includes perceptions of Worry,
Catastrophic, and Newness, all representing risk perception from an
affective perspective (Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 2004). Cronbach’s
alpha for all three factors was acceptable (all ≥ 0.790) (Table 3). The
main variables and measures are summarized in Table 4.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here]

Analysis And Results
Manipulation Check
Results of a t-test show that the risk manipulation was
successful, as participants, on average, perceived the overall risk
exposure (OverallRisk) (Table 5) to be significantly higher (t = -4.579,
p < 0.01) in the high risk disclosure condition (Mean = 61.83, s.d. =
13.02, n = 30) than in the low risk disclosure condition (Mean =
47.13, s.d. = 12.05, n = 32).

Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis
We performed ANOVA tests and correlation analyses on key
variables to evaluate differences across treatment conditions and
provide a preliminary evaluation of relationships. Table 5 reveals that
participants under the low risk disclosure condition, on average,
perceive less risk (Risk-as-Analysis, Risk-as-Feelings, and Risk-asControl) and made more favorable investment judgments than
participants under the high risk disclosure condition. Results in Table 6
confirm the positive correlation between the risk manipulation
condition and participants’ risk judgments. Further, Investor
Judgments are negatively correlated with Risk Disclosure (p = 0.001),
BODs Oversight Disclosure (p = 0.056), Risk-as-Analysis (p = 0.059),
and Risk-as-Feelings (p = 0.001).
[Insert Tables 5 & 6 here]
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Test of Hypotheses 1 and 2: The Impact of BODs Oversight
Disclosure on Investor Judgments
We performed a 2 x 2 ANOVA with Investor Judgments as the
dependent variable and Risk Disclosure (high versus low risk
exposures) and BODs Oversight Disclosure (absence versus presence)
as independent variables. Table 7, Panel B, and Figure 2 show
significant main effects of Risk Disclosure (F = 12.550, p < 0.01) and
BODs Oversight Disclosure (F = 4.102, p = 0.047) and a significant
interaction (F = 6.597, p = 0.013) between Risk Disclosure and BODs
Oversight Disclosure on participants’ Investor Judgments.
[Insert Table 7 and Figure 2 here]
To gain a better understanding of differences in Investor
Judgments, we performed planned contrast tests on Investor
Judgments across the four treatment conditions: LR (Low Risk
Disclosed)/Absence (of BODs Oversight Disclosure), LR/Presence (of
BODs Oversight Disclosure), HR (High Risk Disclosed)/Absence, and
HR/Presence. The coefficients for the contrast between LR/Absence
and LR/Presence (or HR/Absence and HR/Presence) are -1 and +1,
respectively, and for the remaining treatment conditions are 0. Under
the high risk exposure condition, our results (not tabulated) failed to
indicate significant differences in participants’ Investor Judgments (t =
0.378, p = 0.706) between the presence of BODs Oversight Disclosure
(Mean = 81.13, s.d. = 19.53) and the absence of BODs Oversight
Disclosure (Mean = 77.27, s.d. = 31.02). In contrast, under the low
risk exposure condition, participants’ Investor Judgments in the
presence of BODs Oversight Disclosure (Mean = 88.07, s.d. = 22.78)
were significantly less (t = -3.299, p = 0.002) than participants’
Investor Judgments in the absence of BODs Oversight Disclosure
(Mean = 120.76, s.d. = 34.76). These results support hypotheses 1
and 2.
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Test of Hypothesis 3: The Mediating Role of Risk-AsFeelings in Investor Judgments
To test hypothesis 3, we performed a one-way ANOVA and
Tukey’s HSD test across the four treatment conditions and found
significant mean differences only in Risk-as-Feelings under the low risk
disclosure condition. Specifically, the mean of Risk-as-Feelings in the
absence of BODs Oversight Disclosure was significantly lower (Mean =
83.9, s.d. = 23.1) compared to the mean of Risk-as-Feelings in the
presence of BODs Oversight Disclosure (Mean = 121.3, s.d. = 37.5) (p
< 0.05). In contrast, under the high risk disclosure condition, Risk-asFeelings (Mean = 178.5, s.d. = 47.8) in the absence of BODs
Oversight Disclosure did not differ significantly (p = 0.907) from Riskas-Feelings (Mean = 169.3, s.d. = 39.9) in the presence of BODs
Oversight Disclosure. Likewise, as shown in Table 5, differences in the
mean of Risk-as-Analysis or Risk-as-Control from the absence of BODs
Oversight Disclosure to the presence of BODs Oversight Disclosure
were not significant (all p > 0.10), irrespective of high or low risk
disclosure condition. These results support our underlying assumption
that the addition of BODs oversight disclosure will amplify investors’
affective reactions to risk information when financial statement
disclosures indicate exposures to a low level of operational and
financial risks.
A mediation analysis was subsequently performed as outlined in
Baron and Kenny (1986). Our results for the combined data for both
the high and low Risk Disclosure conditions show no significant
relationships between BODs Oversight Disclosure and Risk-as-Analysis,
Risk-as-Feelings, or Risk-as-Control (all p > 0.05). Due to the lack of
significant relationships, results are not tabulated for the combined
data. Following the initial analysis, we performed the mediation tests
on the data split according to high and low Risk Disclosure conditions.
Under the high Risk Disclosure condition, we do not find a significant
association between BODs Oversight Disclosure and Investor
Judgments (p = 0.686) or between BODs Oversight Disclosure and
Risk-as-Analysis (p = 0.756), Risk-as-Feelings (p = 0.569) or Risk-asControl (p = .939). These results reveal that none of the risk
assessments from the affective perspective (Risk-as-Feelings), the
perspective of perceived controllability of risk (Risk-as-Control) or the
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decision-theory perspective (Risk-as-Analysis) account for the
relationship between BODs Oversight Disclosure and Investor
Judgments, and that positive information on boards’ leadership and
role in risk oversight did not influence Investor Judgments.
In contrast, under the low Risk Disclosure condition, only Riskas-Feelings fully mediates the relationship between BODs Oversight
Disclosure and Investor Judgments (Sobel test statistic = 2.6349, p =
0.008). Specifically, the results show significant relationships between
BODs Oversight Disclosure and Risk-as-Feelings (p < 0.05) (p21 in
Figure 3), between Risk-as-Feelings and Investor Judgments (p32 in
Figure 3), and between BODs Oversight Disclosure and Investor
Judgments (p < 0.05) (p31 in Figure 3). When we control for Risk-asFeelings in the models, we find that the relationship between BODs
Oversight Disclosure and Investor Judgments was not significant (both
p > 0.05) (p31’ in Figure 3). These results support hypothesis 3 and
suggest that BODs oversight disclosure causes investors to worry and
perceive catastrophes and unfamiliarity about risk exposures, and
make Investor Judgments based on their feelings toward risks
disclosed rather than on an analytical assessment of risk or perception
of risk controllability.
[Insert Figure 3 here]

Supplementary Analyses
To evaluate the potential for attention to negative information in
the context of risk disclosure, we performed a t-test on Information
Usage per each category of information disclosure. Results in Table 8,
Panel A, indicate that the usage of Risk Disclosure information for
making investment decisions is significantly greater in the high Risk
Disclosure condition than in the low Risk disclosure condition (t =
3.529, p = 0.001). Further, the usage of Operational and Financial
Risk Disclosure is significantly greater in the high Risk Disclosure
condition than in the low Risk Disclosure condition (t = 3.405, p =
0.001). In contrast, the difference in the usage of Other Risk
Disclosure is insignificant (t = - 0.948, p = 0.347) across the risk
disclosure conditions. These results provide support for the assumption
that participants pay more attention to information with a high risk
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outcome than information with a low risk outcome (e.g., Fiske, 1980;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Taylor, 1991) and suggest that Other
Risk Disclosure does not contribute to the variation of Investor
Judgments (or decrease the internal validity of the study).
We also performed additional t-tests on Information Usage
between the presence/absence of BODs Oversight Disclosure
conditions. Results in Table 8, Panel B, suggest that participants with
BODs Oversight Disclosure shifted their attention to oversight
disclosure information and focused less attention to other types of
information (i.e., risk disclosure and financial ratios) compared to
participants without BODs Oversight Disclosure. In addition, regression
analysis results in Table 8, Panel C, show that Investor Judgments are
not significantly associated with BODs Oversight Disclosure under the
high Risk Disclosure condition but are negatively associated with BODs
Oversight Disclosure under the low Risk Disclosure condition at a
significance level of 0.05. These results corroborate our findings for
hypotheses 1 and 2.

Conclusion and Discussion
This study examines whether the disclosure of positive
information about BODs quality and leadership role in risk oversight
mitigates the effect of negative information about operational and
financial risk exposures on investor judgments. We found that the
addition of BODs oversight disclosure does not influence investor
judgments in the high risk disclosure condition, but causes investor
judgments to be less favorable in the low risk disclosure condition. In
the latter condition, investors view the investment opportunity less
favorably when they learn about the BODs quality and leadership role
in risk oversight after being informed of the firm’s exposure to
operational and financial risks. This counterintuitive result is explained
by investors’ risk assessment from the affective perspective—i.e.,
Risk-as-Feelings (Slovic et al., 2004). Further analysis reveals that in
the low risk disclosure condition, the addition of BODs oversight
disclosure leads investors to judge risk in terms of worry, catastrophic
potentials, and unfamiliarity about risk information (Risk-as-Feelings)
more than in terms of probabilities and outcome (Risk-as-Analysis) or
perceived controllability (Risk-as-Control) and may cause investors to
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make investor judgments based on their feelings toward risks
disclosed rather than analytical assessment or perceived controllability
of risk.
Results of this study are limited by our experimental design and
constraints inherent in experimental research (Shadish, Cook, &
Campbell, 2002), and therefore readers should interpret our results
with care. For example, the experimental setting represents an
abstraction from reality and may not allow participants to fully engage
themselves as if they were in a real investment context with much
richer information than that depicted in the case materials.
Specifically, our participants were provided with a hypothetical
company’s financial information, including disclosures on risk
information and the BODs risk oversight, in a condensed version. We
opted to provide this abridged version to make sure that all required
tasks were completed within a reasonable amount of time. Although
we pre-tested the instrument to assess if the content of the financial
information was realistic and relevant for the task, the compression of
financial information does not represent the amount of material that
investors would have to process and analyze when making a real
investment decision.
Despite these limitations we anticipate that the results of our
study will be valued by academics, practitioners, and regulators alike.
From a practical perspective, this study contributes to the debate on
the usefulness of disclosures. Our findings indicate that positive
information about the board’s leadership and role in risk oversight is
not effectively incorporated into investors’ judgment and decisionmaking process, irrespective of a high or low risk disclosure condition,
and does not lead investors to make “informed investment decisions”
(SEC, 2009, p. 4). Our findings suggest that communicating risk
oversight practices, particularly the role of the BODs leadership
structure and role in monitoring operational and financial risk
management, may also be challenging for firms with low risk
exposures. From a theoretical perspective, the findings contribute to
the literature on negativity bias in investors’ judgments (Cianci &
Falsetta, 2008; Ghosh & Wu, 2012) in the context of risk and BODs
oversight disclosures.
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Researchers may also be interested in extending our study to
provide a broader understanding of the effects of risk and BODs
oversight disclosures. For example, our participants made investment
judgments when BODs oversight information was presented after risk
exposure information but not before. It is not clear whether oversight
disclosure preceding risk exposure information will result in primacy
(e.g., Anderson & Maletta, 1999; Wilks, 2002) or recency effects on
investor judgments (e.g., Ahlawat, 1999; Ashton & Ashton, 1988).
Future research could look into this issue. We also did not examine
whether investors suffer from information overload if they were
provided with information about risk exposures and BODs oversight
disclosure or instructed to find disclosure information in the entire
annual report. Future research could gain insight into the specific
factors causing disclosure overload between those two conditions and
examine the effects of disclosure overload on investors’ effort to
process information (i.e., risk and BODs oversight disclosure) and their
judgment and decision making. Finally, future research could also
examine the impact of firm familiarity or non-familiarity versus
immediate or delayed availability of BODs oversight disclosure on
investors’ judgments, as well as identifying mitigating factors that can
offset investors’ affective reactions or increase investors’ reliance on
reason-based analysis.
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Appendix A: Risk Disclosure Manipulation
Participants received a detailed disclosure of operational risk
and a sensitivity analysis of selling, general, and administrative (SGA)
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expenses and cost of goods sold (COGS). The sensitivity analysis for a
high (or low) level of operational risk exposure described that a failure
to achieve a 10% reduction in cost savings would cause an economic
loss of approximately 40% (or 1% in the low risk disclosure condition)
on the company’s equity and result in severe harm (or ‘would not
adversely affect’ in the low risk disclosure condition) long-term
profitability and financial strength.
In addition, participants received a detailed disclosure on financial risk
and a sensitivity analysis associated with long-term debts subject to
variable interest rates and commodity prices subject to future and
option commodity prices.
The sensitivity analysis for a high (or low) level of interest rate
risk indicated that a 10%1 increase in the market interest rate would
cause an economic loss of approximately 40% (or 1% in the low risk
condition) of the company’s equity and result in severe harm (or
‘would not adversely affect’ in the low risk disclosure condition) to
long-term profitability and financial strength. The sensitivity analysis
for a high (or low) level of commodity price risk indicated that if
hedging prices are in excess of spot prices by 10%, this situation
would cause an economic loss to the company in the amount of
approximately 40% of the company’s equity (or 1% in the low risk
condition).

Appendix B: Board Oversight Of Enterprise Risk
The Board utilizes our Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) process to
assist in fulfilling its oversight of our risks.
Management, which is responsible for day-to-day risk management,
conducts a risk assessment of SW’s business annually.
o The risk assessment process is global in nature and has been
developed to identify and assess SW’s risks, including the nature
of the risk, as well as to identify steps to mitigate and manage
each risk.
o Several hundred of our key business leaders, functional heads
and other managers are surveyed and/or interviewed to develop
this information.
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While risk oversight is a full Board responsibility, the responsibility for
monitoring the ERM process has been delegated to the Audit
Committee. As such, one of the leaders of the ERM process is the Vice
President, Internal Audit, who reports directly to the Chair of the Audit
Committee.
The results of the risk assessment are reviewed with the Audit
Committee and the full Board:
o The centerpiece of the assessment is the discussion of key
risks, which includes the potential magnitude and likelihood of
each risk.
As part of the process for each risk, management identifies each one
of the following key points:
o The nature of the risk
o The senior executive responsible for managing the risk
o The potential impact
o Management’s initiatives to manage the risk
o The most recent Board or Committee update, and
o The timing of the next scheduled Board or Committee review.
In addition to the enterprise-wide assessment, each business unit
discusses its risk assessment as part of its annual business plan review
with the Board.
The results of the risk assessments are then integrated into the
Board’s processes.
o Oversight responsibility for each risk is allocated among the
full Board and its Committees, and specific Board and
Committee agendas are developed accordingly.
Each Committee chair has the following responsibilities:
o Work directly with SW’s key senior executive responsible for
the matters allocated to the Committee to develop agenda
topics
o Review materials to be discussed with the Committee
o Discuss specific topics relating to the particular Committee
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Through the above process each key risk is reviewed at least annually,
with many topics reviewed on several occasions throughout the year.
Due to the dynamic nature of risk, BODs has taken the following
oversight/review actions to fulfill its oversight responsibilities of SW’s
risks:
o The overall status of SW’s enterprise and business unit risks
are updated.
o A summary of key risks is reviewed at each Audit Committee
meeting and adjustments are made to Board and Committee
agendas throughout the year.
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Endnotes
1

The Security Exchange Commission (SEC, 2000) press release concerning
former Chairman Laura Unger’s comments on fair disclosure can be
retrieved from http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch387.htm.
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2

3

4

5

6

7

Major risk disclosure regulations pertain to accounting for derivative
instruments and hedging activities (SFAS No. 133, FASB, 1998),
disclosures about segments of an enterprise and related information
(SFAS No. 131, FASB, 1997), contingencies (SFAS No. 5, FASB, 1975),
postretirement benefits other than pensions (SFAS No. 106, FASB,
1990), small and medium sized entities’ exposures to certain
significant risks and uncertainties (SOP No. 94-6, AICPA, 1994),
forward-looking qualitative and quantitative market risk (FRR No. 48,
SEC, 1997), and transfers of financial assets and extinguishments of
liabilities (SFAS No. 140, FASB, 2000) (Dobler, 2008; Koonce et al.,
2005).
Distrust has been shown to be strongly linked to risk perception (Slovic,
1993, p. 675-676).
Inherent risk is the risk that a financial statement will contain material error
or misstatement when related internal controls are not present or
effectively implemented (AICPA, 2006, p. 1652).
Hodge and Pronk (2006; p. 272) note that professional investors (analysts)
generally have well-defined valuation knowledge and use their
expertise to focus on financial information and disclosures that they
perceive relevant to their investment judgments. In contrast, nonprofessional investors (e.g., MBA students) have relatively ill-defined
valuation knowledge and fail to identify specific financial information
for investment judgments. Stock market investors fall in-between
these two categories because (1) they are not as expert (or
sophisticated) as professional investors who specialize in valuation
analyses, but (2) they are more expert than non-professional investors
as their investment experience stems from engaging in investment of
stocks on a regular or professional basis as compared to nonprofessional investors’ investment experience, which results from
general business work experience and completion of business courses
(Victoravich, 2010).
Of the 62 participants, 17 participants work at investment banks, 17 work at
commercial banks or commercial bank trust departments, 13 work at
brokerage firms, 4 work in accounting firms, and 11 work in corporate
financial positions.
Despite the marginally significant relationship between Investor Judgments
and Undergraduate Major, results of Tukey’s HSD test procedure
reveal that the average Investor Judgments of finance majors
(Mean=101.88, s.d.=30.19) is not significantly greater than the
average Investor Judgments of accounting majors (Mean=81.38, s.d.
44.62) (p = 0.469), business administration majors (Mean=94.50, s.d.
28.21) (p = 0.957), or others (Mean=71.88, s.d. 26.72) (p = 0.124).
Given the marginally significant relationship between Investor
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Judgments and Undergraduate Major, we tested hypotheses using a 2
x 2 design with Undergraduate Major as a covariate. The ANCOVA
results are statistically similar to the results associated with a 2 x 2
design without the covariate.
8
A total of 136 upper division accounting and/or business major students
from one public university and two private universities in the Midwest
participated in a pilot test of the experimental material. Based on the
pilot test results, we concluded that the experimental manipulations
were effective.
9
The 160 listed firms represent the largest economies with the largest
domestic market capitalization in North America and Europe,
respectively (Dobbler et al., 2011, p. 2).
10
Non-financial risks disclosed in the annual report of a Fortune 500 company
(a food manufacturing company) consist of regulatory risk, technology
risk, food quality and safety risk, management risk, and intellectual
property rights risk. This information was provided to participants
across the four treatment conditions.
11
In the condition with BODs oversight disclosure, participants were informed
that (1) all members of the board are independent directors and
former/current top executives of Fortune 500 companies with
expertise and business experience, (2) Audit Committee members are
financial experts (i.e., Certified Public Accountants), and (3) the board
of directors held 8 annual meetings and all of the incumbent directors
attended at least 75% of the total number of annual board meetings.
12
Among the 13 items related to risk perception from the decision-theory and
behavioral perspectives, we only used 11 items, omitting Voluntary
and Immediacy. The question about Voluntary is related to investment
judgments if a person is not aware of operational and financial risk
items. We excluded Voluntary because we believe this question may
induce early anticipation of investment judgment when participants are
instructed to make investment judgments after evaluating information
on risk disclosure and BODs oversight role, if required. The question
about Immediacy is related to whether a person can ascertain the
occurrence of operating and financial risk scenarios in an immediate
future or over time. We believe that it is difficult to forecast how soon
or late operating and financial risk exposure scenarios might occur due
to the lack of specific disclosure information in this regard. As a result,
we also chose to exclude this item.
13
A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on the items to test
dimensionality using a VARIMAX rotation for Eigen values greater than
1.0. The use of the factor analysis was supported by the Kaiser-MeyerOlken (KMO) measure of sample adequacy, which was in the
acceptable (> 0.6) range (KMO = 0.653) (Hutcheson & Sofronious,
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1999), and Bartlett’s test of sphericity, which was significant (p <
0.001).
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